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Abstract
The Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel have appointed official liaisons to
Builders for Peace both to symbolize their endorsement and to facilitate the process where pos-
sible. The U.S. Government has provided modest operating funds in support of the effort out
of its foreign assistance budget. The World Bank, the Departments of State and Commerce, the
U.S. Trade Representative, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (“TDA”), the U.N. Develop-
ment Project (“UNDP”), the U.S. Ambassadors and Consuls General in the region and the U.S.
Congress have all been consistent supporters of the mission. Individually and collectively, each has
endorsed the general proposition that private sector Palestinian development is not just a worth-
while end in itself, but also a precondition to the success of the peace process. The concept has
now had two-and-a-half years to germinate . . . and the attentive observer has a right to ask
how well Palestinian private sector development is progressing in the real world. The answer is of
course more complicated than the question, but the following generalizations are permissible: (1)
the diplomatic agenda has moved forward more rapidly than the economic agenda; (2) a number
of the economic benefits presumed to be forthcoming with the 1993 breakthrough are only now
beginning to materialize, and most remain hypothetical; (3) impediments that would appear incon-
sistent with the mission’s widespread, high level support have plagued many committed investors;
and yet (4) there is documentable progress in several key areas that provide a solid basis for hope.
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FOREWORD
The Essay that follows was written in January 1996, prior to
the shocking series of terror bombings that killed over sixty in-
nocent Israeli citizens and permanently maimed scores of
others. These cowardly acts of hatred over a nine-day period
have brought the peace process itself to its knees, rendering the
economic concerns expressed in this Essay trivial by comparison.
I was dissuaded from my inclination to leave the Essay unpub-
lished, however, because of my affection and admiration for
Yitzhak Rabin, to whom this text is dedicated, and because I still
believe that Palestinian economic development is in Israel's best
interest. I was persuaded that the lessons I have learned since
devoting myself to that end two-and-one-half years ago are worth
sharing. It is presented in the unedited form in which it was
written prior to the current crisis, which has shaken me as deeply
as it has all others who had the privilege of knowing Yitzhak Ra-
bin, of admiring the natural decency of his leadership, and of
sharing his courageous vision of the future.
INTRODUCTION
To frame this Essay in a manner that will reflect the Au-
thor's perspective, I want to emphasize that I am one of two Co-
Presidents of Builders for Peace - a non-profit organization
created by leaders of the American Arab and Jewish communi-
ties first to foster and facilitate American private sector invest-
ment in the newly autonomous West Bank and Gaza, and sec-
ondly, to assist in promoting broader regional economic integra-
tion. The organization's founders initiated this agenda in
response to a challenge issued by President Clinton and Vice
President Al Gore on the occasion of the 1993 Rabin-Arafat'sign-
ing ceremony on the White House South Lawn. The fact that
* The Author was a U.S. Congressman from California from 1983 until 1993. He
is currently a partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher in Los Angeles and one of two Co-
Presidents of Builders for Peace.
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the founding Board members, indeed the Co-Presidents, of
Builders for Peace represent the traditionally diverse interests of
those two communities symbolizes a remarkably broad endorse-
ment of the concept. This Essay assesses progress under the
Oslo Accords toward Palestinian economic development based
on the Builders for Peace experience to date.
Beyond American Jews and Arabs, Palestinian private sector
development is supported by Democrats, Republicans, Palestini-
ans, and Israelis, and by the spectrum of disparate interests
within each of those entities. Before accepting my position with
Builders for Peace, I met with Prime Minister Rabin, who as-
sured me that his vision of regional peace and Israel's security
included the betterment of Palestinian conditions and urged me
to do all I could to lead that agenda forward. Shimon Peres has
echoed the same theme on numerous occasions with the belief
that "a dollar invested in the West Bank or Gaza is two dollars
invested in Israeli security." The Palestinian Authority and the
Government of Israel have appointed official liaisons to Builders
for Peace both to symbolize their endorsement and to facilitate
the process where possible. The U.S. Government has provided
modest operating funds in support of the effort out of its foreign
assistance budget. The World Bank, the Departments of State
and Commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative, the U.S. Trade
and Development Agency ("TDA"), the U.N. Development Pro-
ject ("UNDP"), the U.S. Ambassadors and Consuls General in
the region, and the U.S. Congress have all been consistent sup-
porters of the mission.
Individually and collectively, each has endorsed the general
proposition that private sector Palestinian development is not
just a worthwhile end in itself, but also a precondition to the
success of the peace process. The concept has now had two-and-
a-half years to germinate since the Declaration of Principles' and
the historic Rabin-Arafat handshake, however, and the attentive
observer has a right to ask how well Palestinian private sector
development is progressing in the real world. The answer is of
course more complicated than the question, but the following
generalizations are permissible: (1) the diplomatic agenda has
moved forward more rapidly than the economic agenda; (2) a
1. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13,
1993, Isr.-PLO, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993) [hereinafter Declaration].
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number of the economic benefits presumed to be forthcoming
with the 1993 breakthrough are only now beginning to material-
ize, and most remain hypothetical; (3) impediments that would
appear inconsistent with the mission's widespread, high level
support have plagued many committed investors; and yet (4)
there is documentable progress in several key areas that provide
a solid basis for hope.
I. ECONOMY OF THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORES
Economic and demographic data on the newly autonomous
Palestinian territories reveal both the self-evident urgency for
private sector development and the realism that imbues its advo-
cates. Not surprisingly for a region whose political status has
been so tumultuous for so long, any such data are somewhat
speculative. Moreover, because border restrictions still inhibit
free movement between Gaza and the West Bank, it is necessary
to describe them separately in order to present a useful picture
of the economic challenge. The combined population of these
territories is roughly 2.3 million - about the same as St. Louis
- with 35% of it in Gaza, making it one of the most densely
populated pieces of real estate on Earth. Additionally, the Pales-
tinian population is growing at a rapid 3% in West Bank and
3.3% in Gaza. The September 1995 "Oslo II" Agreement 2 gave
self rule to 99% of the Palestinian population within 27% of the
West Bank's 5800 square kilometers. Two hundred of Gaza's
340 square kilometers received autonomy under Oslo I3 in May
1994.
The West Bank's purported per capita annual income of
US$1700 is twice that of Gaza and roughly 10% of Israel. The
overall Palestinian gross national product ("GNP") of US$3 bil-
lion is smaller than that of several Caribbean islands. The
380,000 strong combined labor force, at least 50% of which is
2. As used in this paper, "Oslo II" is the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-PLO (on file with the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal).
3. As used in this paper, the term "Oslo I" encompasses: the Declaration, supra
note 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1525; the Israel-PLO Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho
Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-PLO, 33 I.L.M. 622 [hereinafter Cairo Agreement]; and the
Protocol on Economic Relations between Israel and the PLO, which was later included
as an appendix to Cairo Agreement. Cairo Agreement supra, annex IV, 33 I.L.M. at 696
[hereinafter Economic Protocol].
1996] 1395
1396 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:1393
ostensibly unemployed, is growing by about 10,000 per year. Be-
cause of the birth rate, 65% of the Palestinian population is
under the age of fifteen. Over 20% of the GNP is earned outside
of Palestinian territory. The second largest source of jobs, after
agriculture, is Israel, whose Palestinian borders open and close
somewhat randomly in response to perceptions of the terrorist
threat. A spate of terror bombings after the 1993 Declaration of
Principles4 led to an Israeli policy that formally allowed approxi-
mately 30,000 married Palestinians over the age of thirty to work
in Israel. This was down from 80,000 in earlier years, but the
new policy also excluded the tens of thousands who are typically
allowed to enter for day labor in Israeli's "grey economy."
The Palestinian territories have never been a state. Prior to
the late twentieth century Egyptian, Jordanian, and Israeli gov-
ernance of these lands, Palestine was a part of the early twentieth
century British Empire. The British, of course, acquired it as the
spoils of World War I from the Ottoman Turks, whose oversight
predated the modern notion of sovereign statehood. The popu-
lation now commonly known as Palestinians has, therefore,
never governed itself independently and has struggled more
than most to sustain its identity, culture, and traditions. Ironi-
cally, however, Palestinian administrative skills are routinely
credited for the economic and commercial coherence of many
surrounding Arab states and Gulf Emirates, and their diaspora
population of 3 to 3.5 million has been among the most com-
mercially successful everywhere it has gone, especially in the
United States. It is to this remarkably resilient, resourceful, well
educated5 pool of "human capital" that proponents of Palestin-
ian economic growth frequently point. Indeed, sectors like in-
dustry and tourism are natural outlets for the expression of any
such pent-up Palestinian commercial energies. To the extent
that the absence of self-rule has stifled growth in these areas, the
new Palestinian autonomy agreements may indeed point to a sig-
nificant Palestinian economic growth potential.
There is also recent historical evidence in favor of this prop-
osition. Prior to the 1987-93 Palestinian uprising known as the
4. See, e.g., Serge Schmemann, Bombings in Israel: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26,
1996, at Al.
5. The Palestinian population has more college degrees per capita than any Arab
state. 3 INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPING THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: AN INVESTMENT IN PEACE 34 (1993).
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Intifada, the economy and living standard of the West Bank and
Gaza grew dramatically. For example, according to the World
Bank, between 1970 and 1980: (1) per capita gross domestic
product ("GDP") doubled; (2) primary and secondary school en-
rollments grew by over 50%; (3) life expectancies increased by
five years (and by another five over the ensuing seven years); (4)
infant mortality declined by a third; (5) the number of house-
holds with electricity more than doubled; and (6) the number
with safe water tripled. Between 1968 and 1980, the average an-
nual increases in GDP and GNP were 7% and 9% respectively
due to integration with, and, yes, dependence on, Israel and the
regional economic boom. Furthermore, Palestinian economic
growth continued even after Israel's economy slowed in the mid-
1970's as skilled workers found employment in the Gulf coun.-
tries and provided remittances that offset weaknesses in Israel's
oil-dependant system.
Nor was this growth restricted to the upper echelons of the
Palestinian labor market. On the contrary, unskilled labor
played a significant role in Palestinian growth and brought with
it a demonstrable reduction in poverty. It is true that job crea.-
tion during this period took place almost exclusively outside of
the West Bank and Gaza, but the data demonstrate the levels of
economic progress that are possible if political conditions per.-
mit economic relationships throughout the region.
As the regional boom crested in the early 1980's, however,
the frustration of rising Palestinian expectations began to take its
toll. Between 1980 and 1987, real GDP growth fell to 5% and
export growth stagnated. This decline - exacerbated by the In-
tifada, intensified by disrupted economic relations with Israel,
and accelerated by the resultant strikes and border closures -.
has still not been reversed. Merchandise exports in 1991
brought in 37% fewer dollars than in 1987 as the Israeli regula-
tory regime restricted the movements of goods and people.
None of this was improved, of course, by the Palestinians' official
and psychological support for Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War.6 Be-
sides the immediate restrictions wrought by this existential dan-
ger to Israel during the Gulf War itself, Iraq's defeat brought a
6. See Stephen Franklin, Banking on Peace in Mideast, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 1994, at ]
(discussing economic repercussions of Palestinian support for Iraq in Persian Gulf
War).
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termination of reliable Palestinian employment in Kuwait and
throughout the Gulf.' Workers who once provided a steady flow
of remittances to their homeland now began returning there
themselves in quest of employment, while diminished consump-
tion in the West Bank and Gaza were exacerbating economic de-
cline.
Ironically, 1991 might one day be viewed as the turning
point in recent Palestinian economic history. The defeat of Sad-
dam Hussein, following on the heels of the West's victory in the
Cold War, put Israel in the most secure position she has enjoyed
in her brief history as a modern state. This unequivocal reality
put Israel in a political position from which she could afford to
take greater political risks. Prodded by U.S. diplomacy leading
to the 1991 Madrid Conference,8 physically and psychologically
exhausted by the burdens of the occupation and the Intifada,
and restructured politically by the Labor Party's victory in 1992,
Israel took the bold and controversial steps that led to the Decla-
ration of Principles,9 which has guided Israeli-Palestinian negoti-
ations since it was announced to an unsuspecting world in 1993.
Sentiments that underpinned the Intifada clearly represent
a powerful influence in the West Bank and Gaza to this day, and
Israel's current security requirements will not allow its political
leaders to permit the open-border commercial environment that
the Palestinian business community seeks. But Israel is in the
midst of a throttle-to-the-wall economic boom of her own today,
and the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council1 ° lifted the sec-
ondary boycott on companies that do business with Israel in Sep-
tember 1994.11 These developments, in conjunction with the
peace process, have opened up vistas of a new regional economy
based on previously unlikely relationships throughout the Mid-
dle East. If this agenda unfolds in a systematic manner, regional
powers like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf countries could
come together with Israel in a trade regime that ideally suits Pal-
7. Id.
8. See David Hoffman &John M. Goshko, The United States; Main Objective is to Keep
Parties at Table, WASH. Posr, Oct. 30, 1991, at A32 (discussing Madrid Conference and
U.S. role therein).
9. Declaration, supra note 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1525.
10. The Gulf Corporation Council. ("GCC") is a cooperative consisting of Bahrain,
Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.
11. Norman Kempter, Arabs Ease Boycott Linked to Israel, L.A. TMES, Oct. 1, 1994, at
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estinian purposes. While such regional commercial harmony re-
mains hypothetical, the diplomatic process has come further
than most expected before 1993, and the Palestinians have
demonstrated - at various times both at home and abroad -
an extraordinary level of business prowess. It is for these reasons
that supporters of the peace process look hopefully toward pri-
vate sector development as both a stimulant to, and a conse-
quence of, progress in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship.
II. PALEST1NIAN COMMERCE UNDER THE OSLO PROCESS
Participants in the Palestinian-Israeli dialogue continue to
re-learn that business has a pace and direction of its own that
can be neither assured nor prohibited by the surrounding poli-
tics. Just as Palestinian businessmen have found ways to produce
and trade at times despite political barriers, no political formula
can by itself orchestrate the rhythms of investment, risk, market
response, trade, and profit. Political conditions are neither irrel-
evant to nor determinant of these undertakings, but the experi-
ence to date has reminded us that what they can do is create an
environment in which unseen hands are allowed to assess, strive,
fail, learn, maneuver, and, if the time and place are right, suc-
ceed. The architects of peace understood from the outset that
the material fruits of their labor had to become apparent in the
everyday lives of the Palestinian people in order for progress at
the negotiating tables to settle-in "on the street," but, alas, their
rhetoric all too often exaggerated the extent to which diplomacy
could engineer such an outcome.
Thus, the photogenic "handshake" in September of 1993
was followed promptly by an International Donors Conference
where the representatives of forty-three states, hosted by the U.S.
State Department, outbid one another in the euphoria of the
moment, pledging upwards of US$2.5 billion toward "recon-
struction of Palestinian infrastructure." In the ensuing two and
one-half years, the donors have spent less than one-third of that
amount, and what has been spent has gone largely to covering
the Palestinian deficit, the recurrent costs of Palestinian adminis-
trative overhead, and a Palestinian police force that constitutes
2% of the population. The United States alone pledged US$500
million over five years: US$125 million from the Overseas Pri-
vate Investment Corporation ("OPIC") in the form of financing
1996] 1399
1400 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:1393
for private sector U.S. investors, and $375 million by way of the
U.S. Agency for International Development's ("USAID") con-
ventional foreign assistance.
The OPIC largess, of which less than one million dollars has
changed hands in the first thirty months, was touted as precisely
what was needed to liberate the dormant energies of Palestinian
entrepreneurship. Private sector investment in an era of declin-
ing foreign assistance budgets would export the best of what the
United States had to offer. Market instincts would move invest-
ment, not philanthropy, into the parts of the economy where it
was most needed. It would not only move more quickly than
foreign assistance, but the profit incentives behind it would cre-
ate permanent jobs in response to the spirit of the Palestinian
market, and nurture the seeds of market behavior from which
pluralism springs naturally rather than being imposed from on
high.
The handshake proved to be a memorable photo-op, but
the agreements it yielded have hardly generated a Palestinian
economic renaissance. Oslo I encompasses a generic Declara-
tion of Principles, signed in September 1993, and a more formal
instrument of implementation that was signed eight months
later in Cairo." Sandwiched between them was a set of eco-
nomic terms and conditions, signed in Paris in April 1994,"s
which became an appendix to the Cairo document. Collectively,
these instruments granted limited economic autonomy to the
dusty hamlet of Jericho, near the Allenby bridge to Jordan, and
to 60% of the Gaza strip, fifty miles and two Israeli borders away
along the Mediterranean coast. A Palestinian-Israeli "customs
union" was formed by the Paris Economic Agreement, but it in-
cluded no provisions for passage between Gaza and the West
Bank, and no special arrangements for moving products in or
out of either location by way of Israel, which controlled access to
both. A series of terror bombings throughout Israel by Palestin-
ian opponents of the peace process not only made it unneces-
sary for Prime Minister Rabin to publicly justify Israel's retention
of border controls, but made it politically untenable to lift them.
Indeed, they tested the very strength of his commitment to the
process in the face of the domestic political anxieties.
12. Cairo Agreement, supra note 3, 33 I.L.M. at 622.
13. Economic Protocol, supra note 3, annex IV, 33 I.L.M. at 696.
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Rabin's commitment, which proved so unshakable that it ul-
timately cost him his life, kept the process together throughout
the two years of Oslo I's tumultuous reign. Indeed, as the aver-
age Palestinian seemed to support the terror more than the Oslo
I, Rabin and then Foreign Minister Peres knew better than any-
one that Palestinian economic growth would provide desperately
needed support for the risks they had undertaken. As internal
political tension dominated the implementation of the Agree-
ment on both sides, and prolonged the negotiation of Oslo II's
expanded autonomy provisions by over a year, questions about
the nature and extent of investment became quite secondary.
Thus, throughout that period, the closure of Israel's borders to
the newly autonomous territories became a nearly requisite re-
sponse to the persistent security threat regardless of the eco-
nomic consequences.
Through various base-building efforts in the United States
and the Middle East region during these difficult times in the
process, Builders for Peace discovered a broad interest in the
West Bank and Gaza from across the spectrum of the U.S. busi-
ness community. Indeed, several investors moved forward and
placed capital at risk in the territories despite the uncertainties
in the wake of the Agreements. During the Oslo I period, two
substantial West Bank housing projects were built and sold with
exclusively private U.S. capital. One of them, a solid U.S. joint
venture with a local Palestinian partner, has stayed in place, fin-
ishing one project while planning the next. Contrary to initial
expectations, however, the American is neither Arab nor Jewish.
Similarly, neither is the family from Youngstown, Ohio that
opened a pre-cast concrete factory in Gaza in 1995. Nor is the
Salt Lake City man who has completed an impressive TDA-spon-
sored feasibility study for the placement of a U.S. crude oil refin-
ery in Gaza to service the local petroleum and asphalt markets.
There is no shortage of interest on the part of Palestinian-
Americans in bringing their success back to Gaza and the West
Bank, but the primary incentive for investment is based on mar-
ket principles, not ethnic sentiments. The fact that investment
moved slower than negotiators had hoped, while disappointing,
is unsurprising. The market merely dictated the same caution in
business investment that the negotiators are experiencing with
regard to the future status of Jerusalem, Hebron, the settle-
ments, the refugees, the borders, and the creation of reliable,
1996] 1401
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safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank. Both are saying
the same thing: "wait and see."
But a "wait and see" attitude is more than many experts
would have dared to forecast had they foreseen the turmoil that
accompanied Oslo I's implementation. Violence from the oppo-
nents of peace on both sides exceeded the expectations of many.
The difficulties of collecting many donors' pledges, and of
World Bank coordination of what was contributed, were hardly
anticipated after the October 1993 Donors Conference at the
State Department. The seemingly routine nature of border clo-
sures in the absence of safe passage within the Gaza-West Bank-
Israel customs union was part of no one's calculus during the
halcyon days when investment opportunities were initially high-
lighted. Finally, the shocking murder of Yitzhak Rabin capped
one of the most tumultuous periods in the history of Israeli-Pal-
estinian relations.
III. PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE UNDER OSLO II
To ask why economic progress was as slow as it was under
Oslo I misses the point, because few would have predicted that
the political process itself could survive such turmoil. And yet
two events that demarcated the transition from Oslo I to Oslo II
demonstrate the readiness of both sides to move forward. First,
the prompt, relatively uneventful redeployment of Israeli troops
from many West Bank Palestinian population centers took place
more smoothly than anyone had a right to expect, in some cases
without even generating headlines. Secondly, on January 20,
1996, 80% of one million eligible Palestinian voters traveled long
distances and waited hours to participate in the first democratic
election in Palestinian history.14 While acknowledging the his-
toric achievement this represents, however, it is important that
the right lessons be learned from it. It would be wrong, for ex-
ample, to conclude that these two events, both fostered by Oslo
II's expansion of West Bank autonomy, manifest unbridled ap-
proval of process as it has unfolded to date.
The Palestinian election exhibits a Palestinian leadership se-
lection process more democratic than any in the Arab world save
perhaps pre-civil war Lebanon. Many candidates who opposed
14. Daniel Schorr, Palestinians Voted for Their Own Participation, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON-
ITOR, Jan. 26, 199, at 19.
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Arafat's handpicked nominees won on January 20, and several
Hamas-dominated areas of Gaza featured turnouts as high as
90%.15 The Carter Center and the National Democratic Insti-
tute, which jointly sponsored a delegation of forty election ob-
servers from eleven countries, acknowledged that the election
had its share of irregularities, but concluded that overall, "the
Palestinian people had an historic opportunity to choose their
leaders . . . and did so with enthusiasm and a high degree of
professionalism." 6
Despite stagnant economic realities that persisted through-
out Oslo I's implementation, architects of the process can rightly
claim that it bought time for the Palestinian Authority to estab-
lish itself while fashioning the first self-governing apparatus in
Palestinian history. But the "no free lunch" axiom applies as
well, because the time bought was purchased at the expense of
other urgent priorities. The appropriate reaction should be a
sigh of relief rather than self-congratulations. Yes, the election
suggests an encouraging degree of pragmatism and moderation
on the part of the Palestinian people. The election/redeploy-
ment experience provided sufficient near-term gratification to
offset temporarily the frustration surrounding unemployment,
inaccessible borders, a burgeoning youth population, disappear-
ingjob prospects in Israel and the Gulf, and soaring birth rates
in a patriarchal culture rife with unemployed fathers. Does this
mean that the man-on-the-Palestinian-street, who presumably
needed to see real benefits from the peace process in his every-
day life, simply knew better and expected less? When compared
to how fulfilling an American would find the experience of vot-
ing, while unemployed, such a testimony to Palestinian faith and
hope would be good news indeed.
Thus, we must avoid the impulse to delude ourselves about
what has and has not been vindicated. If investors and donors
continue to "wait and see" throughout the Oslo II implementa-
tion, as they did during the two years it took to negotiate it, Pal-
estinian pragmatism and moderation will be in for a long and
15. See Palestinians Vote for Democracy, But Will They Get It?, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 27,
1996, at 37 (noting that, in some areas, 90% of Palestinians voted and that many of
Arafat's hand-picked candidates were defeated).
16. Press Release, Preliminary Statement of Carter Center/NDI International Del-
egation toJanuary 20, 1996 Palestinian Election, Carter Center & National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs, Jan. 21, 1996, at 1.
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frustrating test. Oslo II's implementation will take place during
final status negotiations that, for good reason, were delayed until
now. A governing authority has been legitimately elected, but it
now must govern in an area where boundaries are still to be de-
termined, where sovereignty still resides elsewhere, where issues
related to the first intifada remain unresolved in the minds of
most, and where the most intractable issues that have divided the
parties will be on the table. One axiom of the development liter-
ature that I cited in my July 1995 testimony before U.S. Senator
Hank Brown's Near East Subcommittee17 is worth recalling in
this regard. From Iran in 1979 to Tiannamen Square to the fall
of Communism, it is seldom oppression per se that causes revolu-
tion but normally the sustained failure to satisfy rising expecta-
tions.
Thus, those who worked so diligently to elevate Palestinian
expectations after Oslo I -should not be misled as to what has
been achieved. The election itself expressed Palestinian expec-
tations of a better life. It is, therefore, not Oslo I as imple-
mented, but Oslo II as the Palestinians expect it to be imple-
mented, that was endorsed by the elections - much like Benja-
min Franklin's characterization of second marriages as the
triumph of hope over experience. So while the parties are busy
negotiating Oslo III - the "final status" of Jerusalem, Hebron,
refugees, settlements, and boundaries - and while the Israelis
are engaged in an historic election of their own, they should
take a hard, honest look at what has stood in the way of Palestin-
ian economic progress, because that is how the Palestinian peo-
ple will be measuring the governing skills of the leadership they
have temporarily empowered to represent them.
IV. IMPEDIMENTS AND SOLUTIONS
Realistic observers will learn quickly that there is plenty of
blame to go around, which leads to finger pointing among tradi-
tional adversaries. Palestinians tend to cite Israeli border and
port procedures, point-of-entry harassment, and other business-
as-usual practices that reflect a mismatch between policy at the
17. Economic Development and U.S. Assistance in Gaza/Jericho, 1995: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (testimony of Mel Levine) available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Curnws File.
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rhetorical level and practice at the street level. The Israelis, in
turn, point to the Paris Economic Accord as the agreed terms of
commercial relations and to their own legitimate security con-
cerns as the basis of their policies on border access. Similarly,
investors who are ready to begin putting businesses in the re-
gion, of whom there is no shortage, express frustration about:
OPIC's seemingly impossible terms for loan qualification, the re-
sultant absence of private sector financing sources in a high risk
region, the void in formal Palestinian commercial law, the un-
documented restrictions they invariably encounter at Israeli
ports, and the absence of any long-term infrastructural road map
in public sector Palestinian planning. None of these is without
merit, but an official response to economic difficulties cannot
begin with finger-pointing. Parties should grant, from the out-
set, that there is much that each of them can do to improve the
investment climate. It would be inappropriate in this format to
offer an exhaustive listing of impediments that have been docu-
mented, but a cursory review of the broad categories and of
processes for their resolution is worthy of brief discussion.
A. Israeli Practices
By far the most widely discussed category of impediments
involves the difficulties associated with Israeli-Palestinian bor-
ders. One illustrative example involves a successful manufac-
turer of furniture in South Carolina who wants to compete for
European markets. Gaza's geographic proximity and labor costs
could put him in an ideal position to do so. He studied the mar-
ket and its costs and arranged for land and a business partner in
Gaza, but his business plan calls for him to import a container of
raw materials and export a container of finished product every
day. This requires routine movements of goods in and out of
Israeli ports, across Israel, and across the Gaza border, in both
directions. He promptly discovered that Gaza's borders are not
traversable on a reliable enough basis to pursue the risk. His
plans are now on hold because, without reliable ingress and
egress, he can neither establish himself as a reliable supplier to
the new markets nor make payments on an enabling loan. OPIC
and others provide political risk insurance, but it does not cover
border closings to which Israel, as shall be noted below, has no
current practical alternative in her search for security.
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There are additional examples that parallel this case, and
comparable cases involving extant manufacturing operations in
Gaza, restrictions at the Rafah checkpoint with Egypt, diversions
of trucks forty kilometers south from Rafah to Netzama (Israel),
unloadings and reloadings from Palestinian to Israeli trucks and
vice versa, burdensome documentation for tariff and duty alloca-
tions, the unreliability of Jordan River crossings, and the denial
of free access to Palestinian products in Israel itself. Another
entire genre of impediments derives from the absence of safe
passage between Gaza and the West Bank, which restricts even
non-export oriented Palestinian producers to a fraction of their
potential markets. Since there is enough commercial risk associ-
ated with investing in the West Bank and Gaza without these ad-
ditional financial burdens and delivery uncertainties, no one will
build a factory there while these conditions persist. From a trade
and investment standpoint, manufacturing is one of the more
logical near-term sources of large-scale indigenous Palestinian
employment; human resource skills are among the few obvious
assets that Palestinians can offer for near term relief from their
economic plight; and exports are the only means to bring new
money into these depressed regions.
But the challenges these complaints present to Israel cannot
be assessed on exclusively economic grounds. The prospect of
Palestinian trucks moving freely through Israel, or even into the
West Bank and Gaza from other neighboring states, constitutes a
clear and present danger to Israeli security. The peace process
itself has been placed in serious jeopardy many times since 1993
because of terror activities far less threatening than trucks, and
terrorists have used trucks everywhere from Beirut to the World
Trade Center to Oklahoma City in recent years to deliver large
explosives to random targets. No one will find a workable solu-
tion to the border access problem by ignoring or denying this
reality, or by seeking solutions outside of its framework. It is a
classic political/economic conundrum. The Palestinian leader-
ship will find no solution to its economic crisis without recogniz-
ing legitimate Israeli concerns in this area.
Indeed, the border issue brings the Peres Government, as it
did the Rabin Government, face-to-face with core principles that
brought the process to this point. The current Government, like
its predecessors, embraces the political, economic, and moral
obligations associated with Palestinian self-rule and economic
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autonomy in principle, but it has insufficient confidence in its
negotiating partner's capacity to offset the accompanying risks.
The border problem shines a bright light on this contradiction.
It is analogous with U.S.-Soviet Cold War negotiations when na-
tional security constraints could be accepted only under strict
verification regimes. Then as now, verification was too often
cited as both the enabler and the delimiter of the substance of
negotiations, because no amount of verification provisions can
bridge the chasm of distrust when national security is at stake.
The best the sides can do under such circumstances is to endure
one anothers' limitations through partial measures until it be-
comes apparent that compliance is in the genuine self-interest
of both parties rather than an externally enforced regime of con-
straints. If this proves to be untrue, then the process has greater
weaknesses than those associated with border procedures.
The Israelis could accelerate this confidence building pro-
cess in two ways. The first is to demonstrate convincingly that
any burdensome border controls and port procedures that are
in place are there solely for security purposes and not to create
or preserve foreign trade advantages or domestic market con-
trols. They could do this by bringing Palestinian business repre-
sentatives and political counterparts into a process, perhaps in-
formally, perhaps with American or European commercial and
security experts as third parties. It would probably have to be
done at a sub-official level so that no one's national security poli-
cies appear to have been marginalized or subordinated to
outside interests. Secondly, they could take a hard, open-
minded look at creative procedures that have been attempted
already, some of which are now in place. For example, the Israe-
lis themselves operate special "convoys" on a routine, scheduled
basis to transport Palestinian goods to Israeli factories and dis-
tributors who rely on Gazan suppliers. Police inspections and
escort patrols are provided so that interruptions are rare and de-
livery schedules can be met. These are no doubt expensive and
logistically difficult exercises for the Israeli security system, but it
demonstrates that creative solutions are possible.
Other potential solutions, of course, involve the construc-
tion of Palestinian ports, international funding for additional Is-
raeli inspection facilities, and rapid, off-hour escort procedures
that expedite Palestinian containers to and from destinations
without recurring unloadings and reloadings. Experts should
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also closely examine the availability of efficient inspection tech-
nologies that might speed and simplify the border crossings.
The United States has inspectors on the ground at Russian mis-
sile production facilities who routinely distinguish between per-
mitted and prohibited strategic missiles that vary by centimeters
while they are housed in containerized launchers in railcars.
Western COCOM18 inspectors until recently prohibited ship-
ments to Eastern Europe if they included items as small as
haircombs. Impregnable "tags" can be used to certify inspected
trucks at the loading end so that their cargoes need not be trans-
ferred and reinspected enroute to a predetermined destination.
Realism dictates that both sides must enter a quest for crea-
tive solutions with an honest acceptance of one anothers' core
requirements. This means that the Palestinians must accept, as a
minimum, that "free movement" is not exclusively, or even pri-
marily, an economic issue, and that the Israelis must accept the
presence of a determined economic partner and competitor on
their doorstep. Good faith may or may not follow, but without
these going-in positions on both sides, it is prohibited.
B. Palestinian Practices
The second category of impediments involves confusion
and ambiguity in Palestinian administrative procedures. One
American completed a TDA sponsored feasibility study a year
ago for a US$40 million crude oil refinery, that would not only
be a profitable operation in Gaza, but would also generate up to
US$100 million per year in revenues for the Palestinian Author-
ity and provide 1500 jobs. The investor plans widespread Pales-
tinian public ownership with emphasis on service station owners.
But so far he has not been able to get the Palestinian Authority's
go-ahead to build the plant. U.S. officials at all levels routinely
advocate the project in meetings with Palestinian leaders. The
answer is always different, but never yes or no.
Without a doubt, the absence of established, systematic Pal-
estinian-decision making structures on foreign investment has
prevented projects that would otherwise be in place, employing
Palestinians and bringing revenues into the West Bank and
18. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls ("COCOM")
served to keep communist states from acquiring advanced Western technology by
preventing export of such technology. After nearly 45 years, it was disbanded in 1994.
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Gaza. Some will argue that this is unsurprising in light of their
centuries of inexperience with self rule. Others will point out
that pre-election governing procedures by an authority negotiat-
ing for its survival is not the venue on which to judge its day-to-
day administrative performance. But the Palestinian leader-
ship's style of carefully crafted ambiguity in these matters, com-
bined with what is clearly a highly centralized decision-making
apparatus, leaves the Palestinian Authority wide open to accusa-
tions ranging from exclusion of undesirable foreigners to out-
right corruption. Builders for Peace has seen no documentary
evidence of these administrative processes, and U.N. and World
Bank counterparts have consistently said they are nonexistent.
U.S. foreign assistance transfers can withstand the most intrusive
auditing standards, including end-use certifications, and U.S. in-
vestors operate in an accountable, transparent manner in all
commonly known investment undertakings in the region. So
there may be no basis for such characterizations, but in the ab-
sence of open and accountable procedures, neither is there a
basis on which to refute them, which leaves little room for inves-
tors to measure the associated risk.
As a result, projects that would otherwise now be employing
Palestinians and fostering an environment for follow-on market
development are beyond the scope of rational planning. Con-
struction goes forward in areas where infrastructural plans are
unknown or nonexistent. Highly professional bids for large
scale projects that would be funded privately or by donor coun-
tries languish without selections. Infrastructure projects like
power, wastewater, telecommunications, and road construction,
which would regularize domestic conditions and simplify further
planning, remain neither approved nor disapproved.
As we move from the implementation of Oslo I to the imple-
mentation of Oslo II, the assets to improve these trends are in
place. An elected authority is now available from which to staff
ministries and delegate authority to expert levels. A law encour-
aging foreign investment" has been crafted in accordance with
internationally recognized language and structures.2 0 Compe-
19. Law on the Encouragement of Investment, translated in David Fidler, Foreign
Private Investment in Palestine: An Analysis of the Law on the Encouragement of Investment in
Palestine, 19 FORD. INT'L L.J. 529, 603-10 (1995).
20. For a comprehensive analysis of this law, see Fidler, supra note 19.
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tent advisory services are readily available through U.S. funding
as well as a competent array of non-governmental and private
volunteer organizations. The new Palestinian Authority will have
its hands full for the coming year as it strives to expand beyond
the small slices of territory it now governs in the West Bank and
Gaza and to justify the mandate it has been given by its constitu-
ents, but it will have to demonstrate its competence to a broader
international audience if it expects to reward its peoples' confi-
dence with a diverse array of international investors.
Professor David Fidler's pioneering scholarly work2 ' and
Keith Molkner's excellent analysis of the Palestinian Foreign In-
vestment Law22 probably document all of the strengths and
weaknesses of its terms that can be identified in the absence of
case law. The problem with legal analysis in the absence of case
law is that it is only through implementation that a society's cul-
tural values and traditions actually give life to a new commercial
regime. Chairman Arafat has said time and time again that he
favors "free markets." But until Palestinian businesses and for-
eign investors are able to pursue their own commercial instincts,
no one will know what these words actually mean. Arafat has
been criticized repeatedly for his over-centralized role in Pales-
tinian business creation, but such criticism is somewhere be-
tween premature and unfair because he is only now in a position
to assemble a legitimately elected array of ministerial positions,
and to delegate the authority appropriate to their portfolios.
Decentralization will bring its own bureaucratic procedures,
which, especially at the outset, are unlikely to be more decipher-
able than at present. And yet it is clear that decentralized,
nondiscriminating, court-enforced rule of law is an essential
missing ingredient to Palestinian participation in the global eco-
nomic arena.
C. U.S. Practices
A third category of impediments involves shortcomings in
the U.S. Government's own widely advertised investment sup-
port services. An American investor actually opened a precast
concrete plant in Gaza in 1995, leasing equipment from an Is-
21. See, e.g., id.
22. See, e.g., Keith Molkner, Legal and Structural Hurdles to Achieving Political Stability
and Economic Development in the Palestinian Territories, 19 FORD. INT'L L.J. 1419 (1996).
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raeli bank that had foreclosed on a pre-Oslo buyer, and servicing
the burgeoning residential construction "boom." This investor
secured a US$1 million loan, which is the first and only loan
OPIC has made to date for West Bank/Gaza. Another investor
worked with OPIC for a loan to build a large hotel in Gaza for
over a year before concluding that OPIC's terms defeated the
economic viability of the project. Interestingly enough, that in-
vestor appears to have secured private sector financing through
foreign sources under far less onerous terms, but we will not
know for sure until Spring of 1996. Other cases demonstrate
that these examples are unique. In each case, the investors are
seeking alternate financing, and may well succeed, but it has
taken time to discover the nature of OPIC's terms while these
projects languished.
OPIC is a unique agency of the U.S. Government with a
challenging charter. On one hand it is an instrument of U.S.
foreign policy with a responsibility to support private sector in-
vestment with financing and risk insurance in developing coun-
tries. On the other hand, OPIC must operate as a bank that ac-
tually returns a profit to the U.S. Treasury on a year-to-year basis.
Under Ruth Harkin's skilled leadership the agency returned a
record profit in 1994 and expected to exceed that accomplish-
ment in 1995. If all of OPIC's decisions emanated from their
status as an arm of U.S. foreign assistance, it would duplicate the
efforts of the USAID. On other hand, if all it were guided by
were return-on-investment interests, it would be no different
from a private bank.
OPIC must find a balance between these often conflicting
characteristics of its identity, emphasizing one or the other or
both as conditions permit. The fact that Builders for Peace has
often been frustrated with OPIC's criteria for finding that bal-
ance is no secret to our friends and supporters. Indeed, I have
reluctantly seen it necessary to criticize OPIC staff policies pub-
licly despite my high regard for OPIC President Ruth Harkin.
OPIC engaged in an aggressive public campaign through-
out 1993 and 1994, calling U.S. and Palestinian attention to the
US$125 million in financing that the agency intended to make
available to investors in the West Bank and Gaza as a part of U.S.
Government policies in support of the peace process. U.S. offi-
cials routinely refer to a "US$500 million" U.S. contribution to
the international donors effort, of which the OPIC pledge is
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25%. As investors began bringing actual projects to OPIC's
doorstep, however, lending terms that were not widely under-
stood beforehand came to define a decidedly risk averse set of
preconditions. Principal among these is the policy whereby
OPIC will only "lend against" businesses that are up and operat-
ing at their projected performance levels. Loans that support
construction and early operations are available, but must be fully
collateralized so that the U.S. Government is not at risk until
anticipated revenue flows have been underway for a specified pe-
riod, normally a year. The effect of this policy, which places all
of the start-up risk on the investor, is to exclude small-scale busi-
ness persons; specifically, those who can meet the published re-
quirements for 50% equity capital and various forms of operat-
ing reserves, but who need financial backing to complete the
project. Business investment in the West Bank and Gaza is
hardly a low risk undertaking, but successful American entrepre-
neurs have demonstrated a willingness to go forward in the face
of such risk if plausible financing is available. The absence of
such support from conventional banks is presumably why an
OPIC is needed in the first place.
Donor countries, all of whom would prefer to fulfill their
pledge obligations through high visibility, low risk undertakings,
compete with one another for the kinds of projects OPIC poli-
cies will support. Large scale infrastructure projects with virtu-
ally guaranteed revenue streams and mid-range undertakings
with large corporate assets behind them will have no trouble
finding such support. But only OPIC can provide financing for
those who need it most. For example, industrialization in the
West Bank and Gaza is quite low - 16% of Palestinian employ-
ment and eight percent of GDP. But it is the most plausible
source of large scale, near-term employment. Only thirty of the
4200 industrial units in the West Bank and Gaza in 1990 em-
ployed fifty people or more, and the average number of employ-
ees was four. These "cottage industry" operations, which typify
the successful businesses of many Palestinian-Americans as well,
are the most logical targets for joint venture investments, in
which American know-how and capital are joined with local Pal-
estinian street sense. If investors had the capital on hand to un-
dertake such ventures in compliance with OPIC's terms, how-
ever, they would not need financing. In short, their services
work best for those who need it least, and vice versa.
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It may have been that early 1995 was simply how long it took
for serious investors to begin seeking the support facilities OPIC
had been heralding for the previous year or so, but their orienta-
tion toward the "for profit" side of their identity, as opposed to
the "instrument of foreign policy" side seemed to crystalize just
after Congress changed hands at the end of 1994. A Congres-
sional Research Service study in April 1995,2s a New York Times
Article by House Budget Committee Chairman John Kasich call-
ing for OPIC's privatization in July 1995,24 and a spate of amend-
ments to the Fiscal Year ("FY") 1996 Foreign Operations Bill
marked OPIC as a target for abolition by the new Republican
Congressional leadership. OPIC's protection from such action,
ironically, derives from precisely the same logic that most con-
vincingly calls for their privatization - the fact that they return
a profit to the Government, which renders them "self-sus-
taining." In light of Israeli and Palestinian practices identified
above as impediments to investment, OPIC risk aversion, which
amounts to an aversion to investment in the West Bank and
Gaza, is defended by many as well advised. After all, policies that
scrupulously protect the interests of the U.S. taxpayers ought to
be among such an agency's highest priorities. But one of the
principal benefits of U.S. investment in the region would be to
reveal these and other impediments, to provide the case studies
that are needed to identify and eliminate them. In the absence
of foreign investment experience, the status quo interests that
maintain many of these impediments will provide the only ex-
pert testimony as to their effect. In this sense, trails that need to
be blazed through the morass of existing practices might prove
to be comparably beneficial to the U.S. taxpayer. Policies that
weight OPIC's criteria more toward U.S. foreign interests, and
less toward self-sustaining return-on-investment, would help
serve that purpose.
A second area in which U.S. policies as currently practiced
impede Palestinian economic expansion lies in the area of U.S.
import policies toward Palestinian products. The U.S.-Israel
Free Trade Agreement25 ("FTA") included the West Bank and
23. Memorandum from Wayne M. Morrison, Analyst in International Trade and
Finance, Congressional Research Service, to House Budget Committee (Apr. 11, 1995).
24. John R. Kasich, Get Rid of Corporate Welfare, N.Y. TIMEs, July 9, 1995, at 15.
25. United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, U.S.-Isr., 24 I.L.M.
653, H.R. Doc. No. 61, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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Gaza on a defacto basis until the Palestinians achieved economic
autonomy. No one intended for the Oslo agreements to penal-
ize the Palestinians economically, but when the West Bank and
Gaza were considered occupied territories they benefitted indi-
rectly from many of the labeling, tariff, quota, and product in-
spection benefits that the United States yields to a close friend
like Israel. Indeed, attempting to compensate for this unin-
tended consequence of peace, the U.S. Government extended
preferential tariff rates to Palestinian goods under the Genera-
lized System of Preferences26 ("GSP") in early 1995. However,
GSP excludes textiles and agricultural products, which are cur-
rently the Palestinians' most marketable products, and, more-
over, Congress failed to re-authorize the GSP program for FY
1996. Palestinians enjoy preferential trade advantages today
with Israel and with the European Union, but they currently re-
ceive no statutory advantages with regard to the U.S. market.
Legislation that would extend duty-free treatment to all Palestin-
ian goods imported to the United States has been proposed by
the Administration and approved by the House Ways and Means
Committee. It now awaits the approval of the full House and
Senate. As discussed, an export oriented industrial strategy is
the most likely near-term solution to the Palestinian employ-
ment problem, and access to the U.S. market is a precondition
to U.S. investment toward that end.
D. International Practices
The final category of impediments, which involves all of the
parties, is the persistent difficulties they have had in attempting
to create border industrial zones, which would address many of
the impediments this paper has raised. Such zones would be
constructed under specially agreed Palestinian and Israeli terms
and operated under jointly approved but independently
chartered authority. Located on the border, they would enjoy
specially structured provisions for movements in and out, and
thus might resolve many of the ongoing border difficulties as
they relate to both manufacturing and exports. Their special
legal status would 'Jump start" development of commercial law
by limiting its scope to the specific zone, and would enable infra-
structure development to be targeted to within the zones' agreed
26. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (1994).
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parameters. The United States, which strongly supports the
zones for their "quick-fix" potential, has expressed willingness to
seek special provisions for tax-exempt access of these zones'
products into the U.S. market, even if progress on Palestinian
FTA status continues to be delayed. The Israelis and Palestinians
agreed in early 1995, in principle, to create these zones on the
Palestinian side of the border in the vicinity of Israeli commer-
cial centers from which they can draw logistical support. And
yet, the idea which is fully endorsed at the conceptual stage, is
nowhere near a physical reality. This is apparently because the
special security, legal, and commercial procedures that would be
enacted by the parties for the zones have remained beyond the
reach of negotiators to date.
As this seemingly ideal near-term solution slips away, both
sides have begun looking for alternative solutions. The Israelis
would build the zones on their own side of the border with spe-
cial subsidies for investors who bring businesses there, and with
provisions to enable the employment of Palestinians who are
now unable to enter Israel. But the Palestinians are looking for
more than just jobs out of these zones. Troubled by the "state
within a state" status of border zones and reluctant to endorse
Israeli owned zones with Palestinian workers, many Palestinian
leaders would prefer zones located on internal Palestinian terri-
tory in order to more fully exploit the benefits of foreign invest-
ment for their own infrastructure requirements. While the de-
bate continues, a potentially lucrative target for investors lan-
guishes in the realm of unresolved issues.
CONCLUSION
The compelling need for private sector Palestinian develop-.
ment, which essentially went unanswered throughout the period
of Oslo I's implementation, cannot await the resolution of all
final status issues at the political level. Indeed, the compromises
and disappointments invariably associated with the give and take
of diplomacy may necessitate more than ever some evidence of
economic progress. It would be unwise for the architects of the
political process to forget this, or to interpret the outcome of the
Palestinian election as a reprieve from the obligations they have
assumed in the economic realm.
But the economic issues, like the pending political issues,
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have remained unresolved for good reason. They go to the core
of what self-rule and economic autonomy mean. To separate
them from the political realm as if they were an unrelated cate-
gory misses the point entirely. The economic impediments cur-
sorily reviewed in this Essay are the residue of political accom-
modations not yet achieved. They are central to any complete
definition of the final status relationship. But coherent mecha-
nisms for their resolution are not properly structured for consid-
eration at the political level because they have been set aside
from the formal proceedings. To elevate their relevance, to crys-
talize their core issues, and to enlighten negotiators, expert
panels are needed beginning at the semi-official and sub-official
levels. These should include business and management special-
ists, as well the good offices of third party American participants.
The most useful opening agenda item for consideration by
such panels would be an examination of what stands in the way
of progress on industrial zones. The immediate effects of manu-
facturing based "export processing zones" on jobs and balance
of trade cannot be achieved by other means. These border
zones, which the World Bank views as "security islands," would
certainly attract private investment in the form of Israeli-Palestin-
ian, American-Palestinian, or American-Palestinian-Israeli joint
ventures, many of which are now awaiting the arrival of such a
systematic regime for investment. The fact that the parties have
agreed in principle regarding the broad outlines of such zones
means that conceptual issues that will delay other solutions have
already been overcome. All of the problems associated with bor-
ders, ports, commercial codes, business licensing, and access to
markets - problems whose details require definition to be sure
- are subsumed under that broad conceptual umbrella. They
are difficult issues, but a framework for their resolution is in
place. The parties should focus intense, expert attention on
them, with international support, firm deadlines, and clear
objectives.
Palestinian interest in the more internally focused zones for
targeted infrastructure development should also be explored
with the supportive cooperation of their foreign counterparts.
The Israeli Ministry of Trade has also expressed interest in devel-
oping zones on their side of the border - either independently
or through the "mirror model" in parallel with a Palestinian
zone - to absorb currently inaccessible Palestinian employ-
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ment. If the Palestinians' internal "municipal industry com-
plexes" were examined in the same context as these more unilat-
eral Israeli models, the broad outlines of a compromise might
begin to take form. Indeed, the two unilateral models operating
"in parallel" might be able to benefit from the same ingress,
egress, and transportation protocols even if both are not on the
border. The Israelis are motivated by moral as well as economic
incentives when considering the issue of Palestinian unemploy-
ment. The Palestinians are motivated by developmental as well
as economic incentives, but are limited by political factors when
it comes to Israeli dominated economic structures. Confidence
building efforts that begin with a clear recognition of these par-
allel perspectives will discover much common ground.
The World Bank's well established interest in industrial
zones is further cause to move forward with this agenda. This
commitment brings with it the Bank's good offices, technical ex-
pertise, and a degree of otherwise unattainable financial back-
ing. The combination of the Bank's willingness to coordinate
and channel donors' contributions in the form of guarantees to
investors, and Israel's commitment to provide secure shipment
routes to and from ports, overcomes many of the going-in
problems that will burden other approaches. The Bank has esti-
mated that US$200 million would be required for each park, of
which US$20 million could come from donors, US$10 million
from the Bank itself, US$20 million from the Palestinian Author-
ity, and the remaining US$150 million from private investors.
These numbers are entirely consistent with the level of interest
that has been expressed in the American private sector.
The broader issues associated with Palestinian freedom of
movement will require time, realism, and confidence building.
Industrial zones are one way to begin that process at the private
sector level, but additional processes are needed as well. Pales-
tinian producers whose economic potential has been limited by
the occupation, must be allowed to outgrow their roles as suppli-
ers for Israeli exporters and become exporters themselves. They
must be allowed to compete with Israeli counterparts not just in
foreign markets but within Israel itself. Without such an atmos-
phere of cooperation, which will take time to develop, Israel's
own vision of a new regional economic order will be limited to
annual showcase conferences and wishful rhetoric. It is true that
the West's victories in the Cold War and the Gulf War were fun-
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damental factors that enabled Israel's constructive role in the
peace process, but it is Palestinian acceptance to date of Israel's
political terms that has laid the groundwork for broader regional
accommodation. That acceptance is fragile, but so is Israel's
sense of security. Both should be treated with care by those who
are charged with the responsibility of moving the process for-
ward.
